Annotate This… President Bush's Sept 13 Speech to the Nation on Iraq

By Stephen Zunes and Erik Leaver, Foreign Policy In Focus, www.fpif.org

Instead of charting a new direction for U.S. policy in Iraq, President
Bush's speech to the nation last evening was an impassioned plea to
the American public to stay the course. But much of Bush's argument
for staying the course was based on spin instead of reality. In this
edition of Annotate This… Stephen Zunes and Erik Leaver analyze Bush's
statements and offer an alternative interpretation of the situation on
the ground.

"Terrorists and extremists who are at war with us around the world are
seeking to topple Iraq's government, dominate the region, and attack
us here at home…"

While the al-Qaeda still is indeed operating world wide, President
Bush failed to acknowledge findings of his own intelligence agencies
that the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq has dramatically
increased terrorism and extremism in the Middle East and beyond.
Furthermore, the vast majority of those fighting U.S. and Iraqi
government forces are not affiliated with al-Qaeda, which represents
only a small minority of the insurgency, the majority of which are
Iraqi Arab nationalists. Many of the insurgents do embrace a hard-line
interpretation of Islam, but have no desire to dominate the region or
attack Americans in the United States. A comprehensive nationwide poll
of Iraqis by ABC/BBC/NHK earlier this month found that while Al-Qaeda
had virtually no support, a full 60% see attacks on U.S.-led forces as
justified.

"Anbar province is a good example of how our strategy is working. Last
year, an intelligence report concluded that Anbar had been lost to
al-Qaeda. Some cited this report as evidence that we had failed in
Iraq and should cut our losses and pull out. Instead, we kept the
pressure on the terrorists. The local people were suffering under the
Taliban-like rule of al-Qaeda, and they were sick of it. So they asked
us for help. To take advantage of this opportunity, I sent an
additional 4,000 Marines to Anbar as part of the surge. Together,
local sheiks, Iraqi forces, and Coalition troops drove the terrorists
from the capital of Ramadi and other population centers. Today, a city
where al-Qaeda once planted its flag is beginning to return to normal."

As General Petreaus acknowledged, the Anbar Salvation Council – the
coalition of local sheiks and Sunni militias which came together to
fight al-Qaeda forces – was formed last September, four months before
the "surge" in U.S. forces into the province began. These local forces
had been fighting alongside al-Qaeda against U.S. and Iraqi government
troops previously, but al-Qaeda's extremist Islamist ideology and its
massacres of civilians so alienated the populace that the local
leaders have been willing to make a temporary alliance with U.S.
forces to drive out the extremists, many of whom come from Saudi
Arabia and other foreign countries. The hostility of those in the
Anbar Salvation Council to the Iraqi government (which they see as
dominated by pro-Iranian Shiite fundamentalists) as well as to the
United States (which they see as a foreign occupier) raises the
likelihood that once the al-Qaeda forces are marginalized, they will
turn their guns once again on U.S. and Iraqi government forces. Unlike
the extremists, those in the Anbar Salvation Council have widespread
popular support and – thanks to American arms and training provided in
recent months – could end up being a bigger threat to the Iraqi
government and U.S. forces than al-Qaeda, a possibility acknowledged
in a recent National Intelligence Estimate. And they are unlikely to
be placated, as Prime Minister Malaki has explicitly ruled out working
with some of the Sunni groups temporarily allied with U.S. forces in
Anbar.

Even in the short term, this western part of Iraq does not constitute
as much of a success as President Bush claims. Some of the sheiks have
taken advantage of this alliance to settle old scores with other
tribes unaffiliated with the extremists. And many of the
al-Qaeda-related extremists have moved on to the neighboring province
of Ninevah, which has seen a dramatic increase in violence this year.
Even in Anbar itself, there has been an increase in factional fighting
and a recent poll indicated that 62% of the population of that
province rate local security negatively overall. In addition, there
has been an increase in complaints regarding alleged human rights
abuses by American and Iraqi government forces.

"One year ago, much of Baghdad was under siege. Schools were closed,
markets were shuttered, and sectarian violence was spiraling out of
control. Today, most of Baghdad's neighborhoods are being patrolled by
Coalition and Iraqi forces who live among the people they protect.
Many schools and markets are reopening. Citizens are coming forward
with vital intelligence. Sectarian killings are down. And ordinary
life is beginning to return."

Baghdad is still under siege. A recent report from the Government
Accountability Office noted how "The average number of daily attacks
against civilians remained about the same over the last six months; 25
in February versus 26 in July." The Iraqi Interior ministry confirmed
that there has been no drop in civilian deaths. Figures released by
the Bush administration purporting to cite a decline in sectarian
killings appear to be based on some rather arbitrary calculations,
including a determination that being shot in the back of the head is a
sectarian attack whereas being shot in the front of the head is a
criminal act, even in cases where eyewitnesses indicated the frontal
killing was indeed sectarian in motivation. All car bombings, even
those apparently sectarian in motivation, are also excluded from Bush
administration calculations.

If indeed there actually has been a slight decline in sectarian
killings in Baghdad over the past six months, it could be attributed
to the hundreds of thousands of Sunnis and Shiites who have fled mixed
neighborhoods – at a rate of over 50,000 per month – into segregated
enclaves, many with concrete walls erected around them to keep out
militants from the other side.

Meanwhile, in a city where, prior to the U.S. invasion, kidnapping and
power blackouts were rare, an average of forty people are kidnapped in
Baghdad every day and electrical power is available only two to six
hours.

This is what President Bush considers to be "ordinary life is
beginning to return."

"Iraq's national leaders are getting some things done…"

Given that the stated purpose of the escalation in U.S. forces this
year was to provide the political space for the Iraqi government to
address the pressing political issues that would make peace possible,
this is faint praise indeed. There is no major legislation pending on
any of the most crucial issues, such as a plan to disarm the militias,
and the legislature has barely managed a quorum since it returned form
its extended summer vacation.

A recent report from the Government Accountability Office indicated
that the Iraqi government had failed to meet eleven of the eighteen
legislative, security and economic benchmarks set put forward by
Congress and made only limited progress on four others, noting that
"Key legislation has not been passed, violence remains high, and it is
unclear whether the Iraqi government will spend $10 billion in
reconstruction funds." Ambassador Crocker and General Petreaus
admitted there was little serious progress on the political front. The
Iraqi cabinet has almost as many vacancies as sitting members.

The Associated Press reported on September 12 that the fundamentalist
Shiite parties that dominate the Iraqi government feels no pressure
for reform since they are confident that the United States will keep
funding and troop levels high as long as Bush is president, so they
are instead focusing their energies on shoring up their positions.

"And local reconciliation is taking place. The key now is to link this
progress in the provinces to progress in Baghdad. As local politics
change, so will national politics."

Claims by President Bush of reconciliation around the provinces have
little relation to reality. This may be in part because the
Administration's figures purporting to show a decline in sectarian
violence exclude such tragic mass killings as the slaughter of 322
Yazidi Kurds in northern Iraq in August or the growing violence in
Basra, Karbala and elsewhere in southern Iraq between rival Shiite
factions. Estimates based on records from Iraqi morgues, hospitals and
police headquarters around the country reveal that the numbers of
civilians killed daily is almost twice as high as last year's level.
Six out of ten Iraqis in the recent poll indicate that their security
situation has worsened since the surge began and only one out of ten
say that it has improved. Seven out of ten believe that the surge has
"hampered conditions for political dialogue, reconstruction and
economic development."

And, no matter what happens on the local level, there is no indication
that the ruling Shiite political parties have any intention to sharing
political power with the Sunni minority in any meaningful way.

"Our troops in Iraq are performing brilliantly. Along with Iraqi
forces, they have captured or killed an average of more than 1,500
enemy fighters per month since January."

Even while the U.S . military is capturing and killing fighters, new
recruits are joining the insurgency at equal levels. The number of
foreign fighters, estimated at between 700 and 2,000, does not appear
to have decreased since 2005. The estimated size of Iraqi insurgents –
somewhere between 16,000 and 30,000 – has also remained relatively
constant. And, even as the prison population escalates, the levels of
violence have not decreased. Instead of illustrating the capabilities
of the U.S. armed forces, his statement about the number of killed and
captured shows the futility of such operations in reducing the
insurgencies. Like the infamously misleading "body counts" of the
Vietnam War, they are not an adequate reflection of the how the war is
going for U.S. forces.

"Because of this success, Gen. Petraeus believes we have now reached
the point where we can maintain our security gains with fewer American
forces. He has recommended that we not replace about 2,200 Marines
scheduled to leave Anbar province later this month. In addition, he
says it will soon be possible to bring home an Army combat brigade,
for a total force reduction of 5,700 troops by Christmas. And he
expects that by July, we will be able to reduce our troop levels in
Iraq from 20 combat brigades to 15."

In reality, there will be virtually no reduction of troops by December
nor will there be a reduction of forces beyond the numbers prior to
the pre-surge levels by next July. The Pentagon currently has plans to
add an additional 4,000 Army troops by the end of the month, more than
making up for the 2,200 Marines ending their tour of duty in Anbar and
nearly making up for the 4,500 additional forces he plans to pull out
by Christmas. Furthermore, the larger reduction of five combat
brigades expected by next July will place the total number of combat
troops at levels no less than there were prior to the start of the
surge, when the Baker Commission – representing the consensus of the
foreign policy establishment – called for the complete withdrawal of
regular combat forces by that same month.

"The principle guiding my decisions on troop levels in Iraq is `return
on success.' The more successful we are, the more American troops can
return home. And in all we do, I will ensure that our commanders on
the ground have the troops and flexibility they need to defeat the
enemy. . . . Americans want our country to be safe and our troops to
begin coming home from Iraq. Yet those of us who believe success in
Iraq is essential to our security, and those who believe we should
bring our troops home, have been at odds. Now, because of the measure
of success we are seeing in Iraq, we can begin seeing troops come home.

"The way forward I have described tonight makes it possible, for the
first time in years, for people who have been on opposite sides of
this difficult debate to come together."

U.S. military commanders have made it clear that American forces
simply cannot sustain the current level of combat troops in Iraq and
there would need to be a withdrawal to pre-surge levels regardless of
the situation on the ground. The drawdown recommended by General
Petreaus and announced by President Bush had already been planned
months ago as there will be insufficient fresh forces available to
sustain the escalation. As a result, this is unlikely to appease those
who want to bring the troops home.

"Over time, our troops will shift from leading operations, to
partnering with Iraqi forces, and eventually to overwatching those
forces. As this transition in our mission takes place, our troops will
focus on a more limited set of tasks, including counterterrorism
operations and training, equipping, and supporting Iraqi forces"

This promise has been made repeatedly over the past four years but is
yet to be fulfilled. When President Bush announced the escalation in
U.S. forces in January, he claimed that Iraqi forces would be
responsible for security in most of the country by this November. In
reality, Iraqi forces appear to be even less capable of taking part in
military operations without U.S. leadership than they were at the time
the surge began. In July, the White House admitted that there had been
a "slight" reduction in the number of capable Iraqi units capable of
operating independently while the GAO report noted that the number of
capable Iraqi army units had declined from ten in March to just six in
August. Over the past year, Americans have trained an additional
60,000 Iraqi forces, yet the U.S. forces are no closer to shifting
their mode of operations from leading virtually all combat operations
themselves.

Meanwhile, despite American efforts to arm and train the Iraqi police,
U.S. Army General James Jones reported earlier this summer that Iraq's
police forces are completely dysfunctional and there was no realistic
path of reforming them.

And let us not forget how General Petraeus, in a op-ed in the
Washington Post just six weeks before Bush's narrow re-election
victory, wrote confidently about the "tangible progress" in building
up "Iraqi security elements" so "to enable Iraqis to shoulder more and
of the load for their own security." Three years and $450 billion
later, Iraqis are no more able to take charge of their own security
than they were when General Petreaus made his earlier optimistic
prediction, raising questions as to what makes him and President Bush
so confident now.

Finally, it is noteworthy that President Bush declared that the
eventual goal for U.S. troops is "overwatching" – a term we could not
locate in any dictionary – Iraqi forces. This suggests that allowing
Iraqi forces to act independently is not even considered a long-range
prospect anymore and that the Bush administration intends for American
armed forces to ultimately be in charge of security in Iraq indefinitely.

"This vision for a reduced American presence also has the support of
Iraqi leaders from all communities. At the same time, they understand
that their success will require U.S. political, economic, and security
engagement that extends beyond my presidency. These Iraqi leaders have
asked for an enduring relationship with America. And we are ready to
begin building that relationship -- in a way that protects our
interests in the region and requires many fewer American troops."

This is totally false. Polls show that 79% percent of Iraqis oppose
the presence of U.S. forces in their country and just 18% believe
American troops are improving the security situation. Polls also
indicate that a large majority oppose the neo-liberal economic model
imposed by the United States on their country and the establishment of
permanent military bases or any political alliance. Excluding the
Kurdish minority in their autonomous enclave in the north, where the
majority is still pro-American, these figures would show and even more
dramatic opposition to any enduring political, economic and security
engagement with the United States.

"If we were to be driven out of Iraq, extremists of all strains would
be emboldened. Al Qaeda could gain new recruits and new sanctuaries."

It cannot be stressed enough that there was no radical Islamist
insurgency in Iraq until after the United States invaded and occupied
that country in 2003. There was no "al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia" – that
group was formed only after the U.S. invasion. And, except for a tiny
enclave in the Kurdish region outside of Baghdad's control, there were
no sanctuaries for Islamist extremists prior to four and half years ago.

Consisting of no more than that 10% of the overall insurgency,
al-Qaeda is in no position to carve out new sanctuaries in the event
of an American withdrawal, particularly since its closest allies have
turned on them.

"If we were to be driven out of Iraq, … Iran would benefit from the
chaos and would be encouraged in its efforts to gain nuclear weapons
and dominate the region."

First of all, it is highly debatable as to whether Iraq would suffer
from any more chaos than it does now under U.S. military occupation.

Secondly, Iran had very little influence in Iraq under its arch-enemy
Saddam Hussein – a secular Sunni Baathist – but has come to exert
considerable political influence following the U.S. invasion and
occupation of that country and the subsequent decision by the Bush
administration to support the rise of Shiite fundamentalist parties to
ally against the Sunni-dominated insurgency. It is doubtful that Iran
could have any more influence than it has today.

Finally, it is hard to see how a withdrawal of U.S. forces would
further encourage Iran to pursue nuclear weapons. If anything, there
are reasons to believe that Iran's nuclear ambitions have been
accelerated as a direct consequence of the U.S. invasion and
occupation of its neighbors and subsequent threats by the United
States to attack them as well.

"If we were to be driven out of Iraq …Extremists could control a key
part of the global energy supply."

Sunni extremists – in the form of the Wahhabi-dominated kingdom of
Saudi Arabia – already control a key part of the global energy supply
with little objections from the Bush administration, which sells
billions of dollars of armaments and security assistance annually to
that misogynist family dictatorship. And, in case less-acceptable
extremists should end up in control of Iraq, the international
community could simply refuse to buy the oil, as was done during part
of Saddam Hussein's reign, without a serious negative impact on global
markets.

"If we were to be driven out of Iraq…Iraq could face a humanitarian
nightmare."

Iraq is already a humanitarian nightmare. Since the U.S. invasion, as
many as 750,000 civilians have died as a result of the violence and
disruption of basic services that have resulted. An estimated 2.6
million Iraqis have fled country and an addition 2.2 million Iraqis
within that country have been displaced. There is no longer safe and
reliable drinking water from any water works and only 30% of Iraqis
have access to clean water of any kind, only half as many as there
were at the time of the U.S. invasion.

"If we were to be driven out of Iraq, … Democracy movements would be
violently reversed."

Unfortunately, there has been little progress toward democracy in the
Middle East and there is a fair amount of evidence that the U.S.
invasion of Iraq and the resulting chaos has actually set back
pro-democracy movements in the region.

Furthermore, President Bush was unable to provide any evidence as to
why a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq would lead to the violent reversal in
the few areas where pro-democracy movements in the region actually
have made some progress in recent years, such as in Lebanon and
Kuwait, which came as a result of indigenous movements based upon
national issues irrespective of what was happening in Iraq.

"If we were to be driven out of Iraq, … We would leave our children to
face a far more dangerous world. And as we saw on September 11, 2001,
those dangers can reach our cities and kill our people."

The Iraqis who are fighting American forces in Iraq have nothing to do
with those responsible for the 9/11 attacks on the United States.
Indeed, none of the hijackers, none of the al-Qaeda leadership and
none of the money trail came from Iraq. There is also serious question
as to whether the insurgent group calling itself "al-Qaeda in
Mesopotamia" has any formal affiliation with Osama bin Laden's group
or whether they just appropriated the name.

If the escalation in American troop strength in Iraq was really
resulting in the finding and elimination of terrorists who could
attach the United States, nobody would want to withdraw any troops.
But this simply is not the case. Indeed, in response to a question by
Republican Senator John Warner as to whether the administration's
policies in Iraq was really making the United States safer, General
Petraeus replied, "Sir, I don't know, actually."

A National Intelligence Estimate prepared one year ago, based on
analysis of all sixteen of America's intelligence agencies, revealed
that the U.S. invasion and subsequent occupation and
counter-insurgency campaign had actually increased the threat to the
United States from Islamic terrorism and had become the primary
recruiting vehicle for a new generation of extremists from the Arab
world and beyond. The longer the United States stays in Iraq, then,
the greater this threat will grow.

Stephen Zunes is Middle East editor for Foreign Policy in Focus. He is
a professor of Politics at the University of San Francisco and the
author of Tinderbox: U.S. Middle East Policy and the Roots of
Terrorism (Common Courage Press, 2003.). Erik Leaver is the Carol and
Ed Newman Fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies.